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Introduction 
On May 8, Washington Post-journalist Jeff 
Greenfeld drew up a vivid picture of what would 
have happened had operation Geronimo resulted in 
capturing Osama bin Laden alive. After the initial 
applauses, the victory soon would have turned sour. 
Putting bin Laden on trial for mass murder in a New 
York federal court – putting aside the fact that it is 
very unlikely that Congress would allow this in the 
first place – would have provided major headaches:  
 
‘What if information about his location 
had been obtained through “enhanced 
interrogation techniques” and was ruled 
inadmissible? What if bin Laden acted 
as his own lawyer, turning the trial into a 
months long denunciation of America? 
What if one holdout resulted in a hung 
jury? [..] A military commission at 
Guantanamo Bay, then? The process 
was agonizingly slow (only five cases 
concluded in nine years), and a death 
sentence for bin Laden would mean 
years of appeals.’1  
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1 Jeff Greenfield, ‘What if we’d taken him alive?’, Washington Post, 8 
May 2011. 
 
Moreover, legal questions would be ‘nothing next to 
the security consequences of taken bin Laden 
alive’. What if any terrorist organisation worldwide 
would seize an elementary school, threatening to 
kill all children unless bin Laden would be 
released? 
Utilising criminal law and ultimately making 
use of civilian courts to try, sentence, and lock 
terrorists away, is not an undisputed approach 
within counter-terrorism. We do not need 
alternative history to prove this point. Former Vice 
President Dick Cheney voiced strong opposition 
against organising civilian terrorism trials in the 
United States (US). In a reaction to Attorney General 
Eric Holder’s decision to prosecute Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed (KSM) before a civilian court in 2009, 
he lamented: ‘I can’t for the life of me figure out 
what Holder’s intent here is in having Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed tried in civilian court other than to have 
some kind of show trial’.2 Cheney objected to this 
decision, arguing that giving KSM and the other 
suspected terrorists a civilian trial in New York 
would be a major security failure and strategic 
disaster: ‘they’ll simply use it as a platform to argue 
                                                     
2 Andrew Ramonas, ‘Cheney Says Holder Wants “Show Trials” for KSM’, 
23 November 2009, available at: 
http://www.mainjustice.com/2009/11/23/cheney-says-holder-wants-
show-trial-for-ksm. Quoted in: Awol Kassim Allo, ‘The ‘Show’ in the 
‘Show Trial’. Contextualizing the Politicization of the Courtroom’, in: 
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their cases – they don’t have a defence to speak of 
– it’ll be a place for them to stand up and spread 
the terrible ideology that they adhere to’.3  
Indeed, even with legality intact, terrorism 
trials are highly likely to turn into a show, a 
spectacle. This insight was corroborated with the 
outcome of the first trial against a Guantanamo 
‘ghost prisoner’, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, which 
sparked off a heated political debate. The 
defendant was convicted in the federal court in 
Manhattan for his role in the 1998 embassy 
bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, which earned 
him a 20-years’ sentence. Republican critics 
objected the fact that the jury acquitted Ghailani on 
all other charges, 280 in total, including every 
murder count. This in turn was used as proof that 
terrorism detainees should solely be prosecuted 
before a military commission.4 Not the final verdict 
as such, but the use of civilian courts in combating 
terrorism became heavily contested.  
 Notwithstanding this criticism, terrorism 
trials are an exceptional opportunity for 
understanding and countering terrorism, since it is 
the only place where all actors involved meet: 
terrorists, state’s representatives, the judiciary, the 
audience, surviving victims, terrorist’s 
sympathisers, etc. The media will moreover report 
and broadcast their performance. As a nexus of 
terrorism violence, law enforcement and public 
opinion, terrorism trials thus offer an ideal 
opportunity to showcase justice in progress and 
demonstrate how terrorist suspects are dealt with 
by the laws of the land. However, governments and 
security officials more often than not are reluctant 
to put terrorist suspects before civilian courts. This 
reluctance can be explained by considering 
terrorism trials as a type of theatre, where the show 
develops its own unforeseeable and autonomous 
dynamics, out of control for the executive power. 
Terrorism trials almost inevitably produce political 
disputes. The whole crime of terrorism is a political 
concept and an essentially contested one as well.5 
Terrorism trials essentially deal with suspects that 
challenge the existing rule – or are at least 
perceived as posing a political threat. Government’s 
unease pertains to the fact that it has to hand over 
control over this threat to the judiciary, with its own 
criteria in dealing with offences rather than purely 
looking at it as a security threat. Governments also 
face national and international public opinion, 
                                                     
3 Ibid. 
4 Charlie Savage, ‘Ghailani Verdict Reignites Debate Over the Proper 
Court for Terrorism Trials’, New York Times, 18 November 2010. 
5 William E. Conolly, The terms of political discourse (Princeton 
University Press, 1993 [3rd edition]), p. 10; See also Alex Schmid, 
‘Terrorism. The definitional problem’, in: Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 36 (2004), No. 1, pp. 375-420. 
which might turn the trial into a media circus with 
its own uncontrollable dynamics, probably even 
causing new security risks.  
This paper will examine the way in which a 
terrorism trial in modern day democracies – where 
the state’s monopoly of violence is limited by an 
established set of rules and criminal law 
procedures and controlled through parliamentary 
oversight and mass media coverage – serves 
multiple ends, depending on the various actors 
involved, who are all busy trying to mobilise their 
respective target audiences around their narratives 
and (in)justice frames. A performative perspective 
on terrorism trials is introduced, meaning that trials 
are the stage where the different actors adopt and 
act out strategies with the aim of convincing their 
target audience(s) in and outside the courtroom of 
their narrative of (in)justice. 
In the words of the president of the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon Antonio Cassese, terrorism 
has a profound negative impact on the national and 
international community because it subverts both 
national law and the international rules of the 
game. Not only do terrorists create havoc, kill and 
slaughter people whom they are not legally at war 
with; terrorism also disturbs social and international 
peace as it provokes states to commit breaches of 
their own legal standards, to breach treaties and 
violate the law itself in reaction to the initial 
terrorist attack or threat.6 Democratic states have a 
lot to loose in the battle against terrorism; the rule 
of law, legitimacy and justice are not the most 
insignificant casualties. To protect these ‘victims’, 
to effectuate a better understanding and a better 
use of legal tools in the battle against terrorism, 
closer attention needs to be paid to the judicial and 
social-political mechanism and effects of terrorism 
trials, especially with regard to their performativity, 
which may create new legends of justice and/or 
injustice.7  
Research into the character and impact of 
political trials in contemporary history has matured 
over the last decades, but research into terrorism 
trials as a political and/or show trial is rather new. 
Awol Kassim Allo did groundwork in analysing the 
show element in political trials.8 This paper aims to 
gauge the performative element in terrorism trials 
in particular. Three principal questions will be 
addressed: Why are governments often at unease 
                                                     
6 Antonio Cassese, Terrorism, Politics and Law. The Achille Lauro Affair 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 139-140. 
7 For a theoretical and historical analysis of this concept see: Beatrice 
de Graaf, Evaluating Counterterrorism Performance. A Comparative 
Study (London/New York: Routledge, 2011). 
8 Awol Kassim Allo, ‘The ‘Show’ in the ‘Show Trial’. Contextualizing the 
Politicization of the Courtroom’, in: Barry Law Review, Vol. 15, Fall 
2010, pp. 41-72. 
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with putting terrorists on trial? What does the 
‘show’ element in terrorism trials mean? What kind 
of performative strategies are adopted in court, to 
what end and with what result? A typology of the 
show element in terrorism trials is developed, to 
gain a better insight into how terrorism trials matter 
socially and politically, apart from the legal 
questions raised. This paper is not intended as a 
contribution to legal theory, but written as a 
historic-political perspective on the phenomenon of 
terrorism trials in modern day democracies.   
 
Why the Unease? 
In the US, after President Barack Obama 
emphasised his preference for trials in federal 
civilian courts and promised to close down the 
Guantanamo military tribunals in 2009, 
congressional interference caused the president to 
retreat from this decision. Early Mach 2011, the 
White House announced that it will resume military 
trials for detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. ‘I 
strongly believe that the American system of justice 
is a key part of our arsenal in the war against al-
Qaida and its affiliates, and we will continue to 
draw on all aspects of our justice system – 
including (federal) courts – to ensure that our 
security and our values are strengthened,’ Obama 
stated. 9 Yet, congressional concern relating to the 
security risks involved in these terrorism trials, 
given that detainees will have to be transferred to 
and tried in the ‘homeland’, prevailed.10 Cheney’s 
objection to such trials has already been mentioned 
above. In the Wall Street Journal, columnist James 
Taranto also invoked the association of a ‘show 
trial’, although he was more nuanced: ‘These trials 
will differ from an ordinary show trial in that the 
process will be fair even though the verdict is 
predetermined.’ However, even if it would be a fair 
trial with just proceedings, it would nevertheless 
contain an element of show: ‘The answer seems to 
be that the administration is conducting a limited 
number of civilian trials of high-profile terrorists for 
show, so as to win "credibility" with the international 
left.’11  
 Taranto hit the spot: even with legality 
intact, terrorism trials are highly likely to turn into a 
show, a spectacle, because the prosecution and/or 
the defendants will adopt performative strategies. 
                                                     
9 ‘New Military Trials at Guantanamo Bay Could Include 9/11 
Suspects’, Fox News, 8 March 2011; ‘Obama billigt neue 
Militärverfahren in Guantánamo’, dpa, 16 March 2011. 
10 Ibid. 
11 James Taranto, Obama’s Show Trials’, The Wall Street Journal, 13 
November 2009, available at: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487036838045745
33833220552624.html. 
As indicated above, the outcome of the first trial 
against Guantanamo ‘ghost prisoner’ Ahmed 
Khalfan Ghailani sparked off a similar debate. Not 
the final verdict as such, but the use of civilian 
courts in combating terrorism became heavily 
contested. The opposition argued that terrorists 
should never be given civilian trials, but should be 
treated and detained as military prisoners. The 
administration, on the contrary, claimed that the 
system had shown that a terrorist could be 
convicted even after a judge excluded evidence 
tainted by coercive interrogations during the Bush 
administration and by acquitting the defendant 
from numerous other charges. The sentence meted 
out – 20 years – was probably even stiffer than a 
military court could have given. 
In response to this case, Jack Goldsmith, a 
high ranking Justice Department official during the 
Bush administration, argued that the verdict 
showed that terrorism suspects should be held 
without any trial at all, not even a military one. 
Indefinite military detention, he said, ‘is a tradition-
sanctioned, Congressionally authorised, court-
blessed, resource-saving, security-preserving, 
easier-than-trial option for long-term terrorist 
incapacitation. And this morning it looks more 
appealing than ever’.12 Since the attacks of 9/11, 
this new line of thinking became dominant amongst 
executives and was reinvigorated after every new 
attack and through military campaigns in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.13  
This tendency to resort to other measures 
rather than criminal law is not solely reserved for 
US officials. In the Netherlands, for instance, the 
government also arranged for other measures in 
dealing with terrorism than through criminal law 
alone. Dutch government officials may pick and 
choose whether they apply intelligence measures 
(observation, hindering), immigration law, control 
orders and other administrative law instruments (or 
a combination thereof), before deciding if a criminal 
investigation should be pursued.14  
The explanation for this unease regarding 
civilian terrorism trials is twofold. First of all, one 
has to consider the element of risk in relation to the 
outcome of the trial. From the executive’s 
                                                     
12 Charlie Savage, ‘Ghailani Verdict Reignites Debate Over the Proper 
Court for Terrorism Trials’, New York Times, 18 November 2010. 
13 Committee on the Evaluation of Counterterrorism Policy (Suyver 
Committee), Naar een integrale evaluatie van antiterrorisme 
maatregelen [Towards an Integrated Evaluation of Counterterrorism 
Policies]. Report no.  IBIS-13174. (The Hague: Dutch Government, May 
2009), pp. 16-23. 
14Dutch Government, Antiterrorisme Maatregelen in Nederland in het 
Eerste Decennium de 21e Eeuw [Counterterrorism Measures in the 
Netherlands in the First Decade of the 21st Century]. Report no. 
04126-6359. (The Hague: Dutch Government, January 2011), pp. 
87/91. 
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perspective – often dominated by national security 
considerations – adjudication is a risky business. 
Terrorist suspects can be acquitted, sometimes not 
because they are innocent, but because certain 
crucial evidence is deemed inadmissible, as was 
the case in the Ghailani trial. This risk cannot be 
excluded, at least not at the cost of turning the trial 
into a huge farce for the government. This element 
of uncertainty runs against the grain of the principal 
goal of counter-terrorism actors: eliminating the 
terrorist threat. Thus, the executive’s rationale 
behind an a la carte treatment of terrorists lies not 
in contempt for criminal law, but in the priority given 
to other (legal) obligations, such as protecting the 
right to life and security of the citizens. This 
weighing of rights is known as the balance or 
proportionality response thesis; notable politicians 
and scholars such as Michael Ignatieff assume that 
in order to protect security, public interest must be 
weighed against human rights. If this means that 
the rights of terror suspects are suspended or 
restricted, then this is an unfortunate side-effect of 
protecting national security.15 Critics such as the 
2009 Eminent Jurists Panel in its report on 
Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights, 
however contend that this suspension of terrorists’ 
rights normalises the state of exception – thus one-
dimensionally enhancing executive competence– 
and pleaded for reasserting the value of the 
criminal justice system, especially in the case of 
citizens.16 
A second explanation for a government’s 
difficulty with relying on criminal law in dealing with 
terrorists, is the fact that prosecution of terrorist 
tends to end in court and may turn into a ‘political 
show’. The main functions of criminal law are 
exerting social control, settling disputes and 
confirming society’s norms.17 Counter-terrorism 
verdicts, however, do not necessarily reflect such 
an impartial truth, nor do they affirm society’s 
shared values. Many terror suspects stem from 
minority groups that oppose an oppressive 
government and fight exclusion; they surely will not 
perceive criminal law or its implementation by the 
judiciary as neutral or legitimate at all. Their 
(perception of) truth cannot simply be ‘tried away’. 
Take for example the trial against Nelson Mandela. 
                                                     
15 Ignatieff, M. The Lesser Evil: Political ethics in an age of terror 
(Princeton, Princeton UniverCassity Press, 2004), p. 46; Cf. also 
Asworth, Andrew, ‘Security, Terrorism and the Value of Human Rights’ 
in: Goold, B.J. and Lazarus, L. (Eds). Security and Human Rights (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2007), pp. 207-209/224. 
16 ICJ, Assessing Damage, Urging Action, Report of the Eminent Jurists 
Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights, 
(International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, 2009), pp.156-157/165-
167. 
17 Vago, S. Law & Society. London: Inc., Upper Saddle River, New 
Jersey, Pearson Education. 2009, p. 19-21. 
During the Apartheid regime in South-Africa, Nelson 
Mandela, who publicly supported violent political 
struggle, was labelled a terrorist partly due to his 
conviction in 1964 for conspiracy. Although the trial 
ended in a legal victory for the prosecution, it 
brought political disaster to the regime. This is 
exactly what governments fear: Although criminal 
law might serve immediate political ends (detaining 
political opponents by sentencing them as 
terrorists), the intermediate and long term political 
effects can be unforeseeable and potentially 
devastating. This way, the element of risk once 
again enters the courtroom. The trial against 
Mandela became a show of injustice; its 
reverberations undermined the political credibility 
and legitimacy of the Apartheid regime.18 
The recent events ending in the killing of 
Osama bin Laden underscore the salience of these 
two points. Indeed, governments are in most cases 
at unease with staging major terrorism trials, both 
because of the security risks and the show element 
involved. At the same time, this show element is 
sometimes consciously used by the prosecuting 
authorities themselves as an opportunity for staging 
a performance of rule of law, of retribution, of 
demonstrating to the world what justice means and 
how it is performed. Under the right conditions of 
legality and the right performative strategies, 
terrorism trials (like any other trial) can result in a 
triumph of justice. The next paragraphs will discuss 
how the actors involved in a trial might adopt 
performative strategies, aimed at convincing the 
audience(s) of their story of (in)justice and thereby 
achieving their end. But first, it is necessary to 
explore what the show element in terrorism trials 
entails and how this element relates to the concept 
of ‘show trials’, a category loaded with heavy 
historical associations.   
 
A Brief Excursion to the ‘Show 
Element’ in Criminal Trials 
Law is broader than a mere summary of legal 
norms and principles; it incorporates amongst other 
things social norms, values, power relations and 
social processes. Moreover, by applying law, one 
sets in motion a communicative process. ‘Law 
cannot any more be correctly understood within a 
paradigm of one-dimensional rationality. […] The 
dramatic rise of complexity, both of law and of 
society, has made such a scheme obsolete’, 
                                                     
18 Linder, O.D, ‘The Nelson Mandela (Rivonia) Trial: An account’, 
website 
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mandela/mandelaaccou
nt.html (accessed 18 March 2011). 
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according to legal scholar Mark Van Hoecke.19 
Legal theorists of the twentieth century held that 
facts and norms could be separated, but this 
positivist view of the law has been under attack 
from all sides now.20 Modern times with its modern, 
multi-layered, complex and vulnerable societies 
have made apparent the weak points of a pure 
positivist approach to the law.21 Law is not (solely) 
about sifting facts from opinions or about 
establishing objective truth, but about social 
control, communication and perception of social 
norms. Trials are the instances in which law can be 
seen in action by the broader public. Trials 
communicate that law is not just in the books but is 
implemented in practice. From a narrow 
perspective, courts interpret and apply legal rules. 
Yet by doing so, they contribute to concepts of 
justice and socialisation of the general public and 
by enforcing the law they are linked to the state’s 
legitimacy as well as the elaboration of policy 
goals.22 Trials thus communicate publically and 
ceremonially to society what it wants its norms and 
principles to be.23  
The law in action is a communicative 
process, but at the same time also offers a 
framework to interpret human actions and 
communication. Trials are the medium through 
which this communication takes place: 
‘communication between legislators and citizens, 
between courts and litigants, between the legislator 
and the judiciary, communication between 
contracting parties, communication within a trial’.24 
More importantly, exactly this communicational 
aspect, within the confines of the court and 
amongst the legal actors involved, serves as the 
‘ultimate safeguard for a “correct” interpretation 
and adjudication of the law’, and thus legitimises 
it.25 
 Since this communicational process is the 
principal foundation underlying the legitimacy of the 
justice applied, a trial is heavily protected against 
political interference and manipulation. A fair trial is 
a basic human right, not only protected by criminal 
law, but also by international and constitutional law. 
The principle of fair trial is recognised in numerous 
international treaties, such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Article 10 UDHR), the 
                                                     
19 Mark van Hoecke, Law as Communication (Oxford/Portland Oregon: 
Hart Publishing, 2002), p. 10. 
20 Ibid, p. 8. 
21 Ibid, p. 10. 
22 H. Bredemeier quoted in Cotterrell, R., The Sociology of Law: An 
Introduction, London: Butterworths, 1992, p. 89-92. 
23 Edward A. Ross quoted in Mathieu Deflem, Sociology of Law: Visions 
of a Sholarly Tradition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 102. 
24 Van Hoecke, Law as Communication, p. 7. 
25 Ibid. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(Article 14 ICCPR) and European Convention on 
Human Rights (Article 6 ECHR). Among others, the 
fair trial principle ensures the right of an individual 
to be informed of the measures taken, to be 
informed about the case against him or her, the 
right to be heard within a reasonable amount of 
time, the right to a fair and public hearing by a 
competent and independent review mechanism, 
the right to counsel with respect to all proceedings 
and the right to have his or her conviction and 
sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal according to 
the law. International law does recognise 
adaptations in criminal justice for reasons of 
national security.26 However, deviations from the 
ordinary practice of adjudication must always be 
temporary and meet legality, necessity and 
proportionality standards.27 The right to a fair trial 
ensures individuals both protection against each 
other – trespassers should be brought to justice 
and should receive a trial – and against the state, 
since the trial should also be fair. In short, citizens 
require protection against both state and non-state 
actors.28 
 The relevance of this normative framework 
that guards the right to a fair trial can only be 
understood against the context of its mirror image: 
the historical reminiscence of the Stalinist (and to a 
lesser extent national-socialist) show trials that are 
considered the exact opposite of fair trials. ‘Show 
trials’ and ‘political trials’ are often mixed up in 
public discourse. The overriding characteristic of a 
classical show trial in the Stalinist sense is 1) the 
total exclusion of the element of chance and/or risk 
from the trial and 2) the predominant function of 
the trial as a tool in educating the population and 
confirming ideological rule. Sometimes, trials are 
not strictly Stalinist, in the sense that they do not 
primarily serve to demonstrate, invoke, create and 
confirm totalitarian rule. However, we do call them 
political as soon as the executive powers use 
criminal law predominantly to further their political 
agenda. Otto Kirchheimer’s Political Justice defines 
political trials as attempts by regimes to control 
opponents by using legal procedure for political 
ends.29 The authorities deploy criminal law to 
maintain the balance of power; they eliminate 
                                                     
26 See for example Article 6 ECHR. 
27 OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights) (2008), 
Human Rights, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism. Factsheet No.32, 
GE.08-41872, July 2008, Geneva/ New York: Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights/ United Nations, pp.28-
29. 
28 Turner, B.S., ‘Outline on a Theory of Human Rights’, Sociology, 
Vol.27. No.3, 1993, pp. 489-512. 
29 Otto Kirchheimer, Political justice. The Use of Legal Procedure for 
Political Ends (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1961).  
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political opponents by reducing their oppositional 
voice to a legal/illegal dichotomy. Here, justice only 
serves political powers, not its own ends. 
However, this type of state-controlled show 
trial, is not the association that was invoked by the 
American comments on the Ghailani case; the show 
element in the trial they referred to was the danger 
that the terrorists suspects would dominate the 
courtroom with their narratives of injustice, thereby 
turning the trial into a ‘terrorist show’ once again – 
the first time being the attack they perpetrated. 
Additionally, there is even a third type of show 
imaginable: a show in which the authorities 
demonstrate, through the way in which sentences 
are meted out, that modern democracies are fully 
capable of demonstrating a show of justice in a 
positive sense. The Nuremberg trials may be 
regarded as a modern model for how a trial can be 
a performance of justice, since these trials revealed 
the evil of the holocaust, established a historical 
narrative that exists today and is accepted by the 
public and the world; they created a collective 
memory, fixed responsibility in Germany and set 
standards for future conduct of states and people. 
Indeed, the Nuremberg trial was the example of a 
convincing performance by democratic societies in 
using criminal law – rather than war or brutal force 
– to deal with war criminals and terrorists. Hence, 
the concept of show trial could refer to totally 
different types of politicised trials, normatively 
charged in completely different ways. In the words 
of legal scholar Awol Kassim Allo, ‘[w]hat counts is 
not that a trial is labelled a ‘show trial’, it is, rather 
the end that the ‘show’ serves.30 This is at the core 
this paper: what performative strategies are used 
by the actors in court to convince an audience of a 
specific narrative of (in)justice.   
 
Performative Strategies in Court: 
What Kind of Show Have Terrorism 
Trials to Offer? 
It has been stated by various experts that terrorism 
is communication.31 Terrorism expert Brian Jenkins 
argued, as early as 1975, that ‘terrorism is 
theatre’.32 Peter Waldmann added to these 
observations the statement that most terrorists 
explicitly want theatre, since they are bent on 
                                                     
30 Allo, ‘The ‘Show’ in the ‘Show Trial’’, p. 72. 
31 Alex P. Schmid and Janny de Graaf, Violence as Communication. 
Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media (London: SAGE, 
1982), p. 175. 
32 Brian M. Jenkins, ‘International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict’, 
in: David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (eds.), International Terrorism and 
World Security (London: Croom Helm, 1975), p. 16. 
provoking state power.33 With their deeds, terrorists 
communicate visions of justice and injustice, 
visions on the rearrangement of power relations 
and attempts to rebalance them. However, counter-
terrorism is communication too.34 The office of the 
prosecutor has a story to tell as well. After an 
attack, or an attempted one, perpetrators are often 
brought to trial. In the courtroom, all parties 
involved in the drama are brought together. Within 
the narrow confinements of this stage, injustices 
are addressed, retribution is demanded and justice 
is carried out – at least in theory. Sometimes, 
terrorists are tried behind the scenes, in closed 
courts; in some cases, trials are so heavily 
politicised or even tampered with that they 
resemble more the classic show trial in the Stalinist 
sense than an actual display of justice.35  
The question that hence has to be 
answered is: What strategies are the agents in this 
drama following and what legal, political and social 
consequences do these strategies have? Does 
politicising the trial, putting on a show, ruling out 
the risky elements in it or inciting the masses help 
to convince the target audience of your mission, 
your sense of justice? Does it placate the 
population, restore social peace, prevent further 
radicalisation? Is that what a terrorism trial is all 
about? Or could it also involve the blocking of an 
audience for the sake of security? This would make 
it a non-performative trial from the public’s 
perspective, but a very performative one from the 
terrorists’ point of view. Following the provocation-
repression theory,36 a trial ruled by the prosecution 
without much oversight could provide terrorists with 
new proof of state oppression, with injustice frames 
to recruit new members and start new rounds of 
violence. Given these comments on the relevance 
of the show element in terrorism trials, a definition 
of performativity will now be introduced, understood 
as discursive efforts, actions etc. to construct social 
realities,37 as applied to terrorism trials: 
 
                                                     
33 Cf. P. Waldmann, Terrorismus: Provokation der Macht (Hamburg: 
Murmann Verlag, 2005); Richardson, What terrorists want (New York 
2006). 
34 Cf. Beatrice de Graaf, Evaluating Counterterrorism Performance. A 
Comparative Study (London/Routledge 2011), pp. 8-10. 
35 Ibid, chapter 9, ‘Terrorists on trial: the courtroom as a stage’. 
36 ‘By attacking the establishment and the security forces, the 
insurgents provoke the state into mass repression which alienates the 
general public, and increases support for the rebels’, as Hewitt defines 
it. Christopher Hewitt, Consequences of Political Violence (Aldershot et 
al.: Dartmouth, 1993), p. 61. 
37 J.L. Austin, How To Do Things with Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
UP, 1962); Malcolm Coulthard, An Introduction to Discourse Analysis 
(2nd edition), New York: Longman, 1985; Judith Butler, Excitable 
Speech: A Politics of the Performative (New York: Routledge, 1997). Cf. 
also De Graaf, Evaluating Counterterrorism Performance, p. 11-13. 
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Performativity in terrorism trials 
concerns acts or strategies adopted by 
the parties with a stake in the trial to try 
to convince their target audience(s) in 
(and outside) the courtroom of their 
narrative(s) of (in)justice. 38 
 
Performance is an act, a process and a product at 
the same time; it provides consolidation of norms, 
re-enactment of identity and the transformation of 
these norms and identities. Performances are role 
plays, in which not only the individual but the 
community at large is involved. Interestingly, in 
courtrooms, performance takes place in a direct 
manner, in the art and form of an Aristotelian 
drama: unity of time, place, and action. But it also 
transcends this place. The performances of the 
actors have a bearing on a broader audience, on 
the political context, on our culture and legal 
system as a whole, in three ways. First, theatre 
produces mimesis: a re-enactment of the offence, 
in the hope of uncovering what actually happened. 
However, the courtroom play should not only be 
conceived as mimesis, but as poiesis as well, e.g. 
making not faking. Performances, like a driving 
test, a wedding, an examination or a defence in 
court, create identities, assert claims to selfhood 
and are part and parcel of confirming and 
producing social relations. The truth is not out there 
to uncover, but has to be created in the courtroom. 
Moreover, apart from faking and making, 
performances also amount to breaking and 
remaking. Some narratives are upheld, others are 
disputed. And in the end, a new one emerges. This 
is called kinesis: movement, motion, fluidity. 
Performance can transgress existing boundaries, 
break structures and remake social and political 
rule. They intervene and make anew.39  
Through a trial, the members of the 
community participate in talk that is incessant, 
escalating and divisive. People will be induced, 
seduced to take sides, are with or against the rule 
breaker. Only then is redress possible, employing 
procedures to repair or remedy the breach. Legal, 
judicial machinery often plays this role. This is the 
most reflexive or self-conscious part of the social 
drama unfolding in the courtroom. Trials not only 
involve re-establishment of the truth or stock taking 
of the harm done; they also contain moments of 
liminality, a ‘betwixt and between’40 of suspended 
                                                     
38 Historically, this definition should only be applied to the modern 
period of the late 19th century and onwards, when the modern state 
developed a monopoly of violence, a modern criminal law system and 
penal code came into existence and mass media emerged. 
39 Elizabeth Bell, Theories of Performance (Los Angeles: SAGE 
Publication, 2008), p. 12-15. 
40 Bell, p. 108. 
knowledge about the outcome of the social drama. 
Courtroom verdicts – guilty or not guilty – are 
exemplary of liminal moments in the redress-phase 
of social drama. If the repair works, the rule breaker 
is removed, or reintegrated into the community. 
However, life has changed. Every social drama 
alters society to a certain extent. These alterations 
might not be permanent, but merely temporary 
mutual accommodation of interests. If this does not 
work, community splits or breaks apart into 
factions. This could be defined as a schism. In large 
scale complex communities, continuous failure of 
regressive institutions may develop into a 
revolutionary situation, in which one of the 
contending parties generates a program of societal 
change.41  
 The outcome of the trial depends on the 
performative strategies adopted in court and their 
relative dominancy. These strategies could be 
portrayed on a gliding scale. On the one end of the 
axis, the terrorists try to run the show, they attempt 
to politicise the trial, try to introduce their concept 
of justice and narrative of injustice and attempt to 
overrule or put to their own use the existing legal 
order. On the other end of the axis, the prosecution 
and the authorities try to rule out the element of 
risk and of acquittal, try to turn the trial into a 
display of political power and a way of educating 
the masses, try to intimidate the terrorist 
constituencies and try to use the trial as an 
instrument for wielding security politics. In between, 
defendants, their lawyers and the state have to 
share persuasive power, are dependent on the role 
of the victims, their constituencies. Right in the 
middle of this partisan axis, the judge or jury sits 
and applies the legal rules in an objective manner. 
The agents involved can enhance their 
performativity by setting the stage, altering the legal 
script, play the media, manipulate the news, issue 
statements and declarations of their own. 
Authorities can issue new laws, provisions or build 
in more security measures.  
This definition does not imply a measure of 
success. The difficulty with performativity is that it 
is a strategy, an attempt to convince. The actual 
outcome of this performance, the way it actually 
mobilises or incites the masses or target audiences 
is hard to measure. The outcome depends, for 
example, on a number of other factors. One major 
element of uncertainty in establishing the effect of 
a performative strategy is the level of media 
coverage, of national public attention devoted to 
                                                     
41 Bell, p. 108-109. 
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the trial.42 This can be invoked by the agents 
directly involved in the trial, but media attention is 
an autonomous factor in its own right. Distal and 
proximate context, historical experiences, media 
logics of that specific time and place, other hypes 
or trends on the political agenda, influence the way 
a trial is covered and reported about. The 
communicative aspect in terrorism and 
counterterrorism also pertains to terrorism trials, 
but media coverage is an essential condition for 
that. Although the media of course can have an 
independent agenda or independent interests, they 
are not considered an autonomous factor, as they 
are no actors in the court. They are mainly channels 
of communication which, however, are not only 
passively used by actors. 
 Like other political trials or mediatised 
ordinary criminal trials (for example the OJ Simpson 
trial), terrorism trials can thus also be considered a 
show, or, to put it more accurate, as a 
dramaturgical play. This is not to say that terrorism 
trials are in all regards fundamentally different from 
other politicised trials, media trials or dramatic 
criminal trials. However, for terrorists and counter-
terrorists, the contest over and presentation of 
narratives of justice and injustice are especially 
important. Compared to ordinary criminals, 
terrorists challenge the political rule or present 
contentious and violent views of justice and 
repression. Before the performative strategies of 
the actors involved are discussed, however, it must 
be emphasised that they can only be acted out 
within a given set of dramaturgical conditions.  
The first element in a stage play is the 
script, which should provide for a plot and for the 
different narratives and story lines to be heard. The 
initial script is triggered by the suspect’s crime, and 
drafted by the charge(s) brought against the 
accused. Criminal law functions as the set of 
guiding principles, dictating how this script should 
be written. Are intelligence reports accepted as 
evidence in court? Can witnesses give testimony 
behind closed doors? The script, or the ‘director’s 
clues’, provide for these legal rules of the game. 
Through altering these rules, the authorities can 
affect the outcome of the trial. At the same time, 
such manipulations with the rules of adjudication 
during the trial ‘spoil’ the game and turn it into a 
show of risk justice, undermining confidence in the 
law.  
Secondly, an important question with regard 
to this dramaturgical element is the nature of the 
                                                     
42 Media in this sense covers all communicative media, including the 
media of the “terrorists” or their constituency (pamphlets, grey 
literature, internet etc.). 
script: is it a script within a civil law or within a 
common law system? In other words, is the trial 
inquisitorial in nature, or adversarial? Does the 
defence need to convince a jury, or is it the judge 
who composes and weighs the material? Another 
structural element that matters is the amount of 
evidence needed to be presented in court, which 
impacts on the length of the trial. In the 
Netherlands, for example, the charges, evidence, 
and defence reactions are mainly exchanged and 
worked out on paper before the actual trial starts.  
Third, the way the stage is set also affects 
the unfolding of the drama. Does a trial take place 
in the normal court building, or are the defendants 
transported to a fortified location, where the visitors 
have to go through heavy security? Are the 
defendants placed in regular benches or locked in 
cages, as was the usage in the Italian criminal 
trials? The courtroom/building can thus enhance or 
mitigate the dramatic nature of the trial as well. 
Fourthly, the play itself is performed by 
actors, who adopt different strategies, which will be 
discussed below. Actors are the prosecution, 
defence, judges, witnesses and sometimes the 
victims. The play will develop through a contest 
between the prosecution and defence over the 
writing of the script. Each will offer their own script 
as the truth and arrange their performance to 
advance this truth. Judges may both be the 
directors and audience, depending on the type of 
criminal justice system a country has adopted.  
Lastly, every play needs an audience. In 
terrorism trials, like in other trials, the audience is 
constituted by the judge (in a civil law system) or 
jury (in a common law system), but also by the 
public in the courtroom and the public outside 
these confines. What the public sees and hears is 
however filtered or controlled by the media’s 
reporting of the trial, which gives the media an 
important mediating part in the play as well. 
Within these dramaturgical frames, the 
terrorism trial will unfold, resulting in different types 
of a show, depending on the relative success of the 
performative strategies adopted by the various 
actors.  
 
A Typology of Terrorism Trials 
Based on the definition of performative strategies 
in terrorism trials, a horizontal axis of politicisation 
may be drawn: from the left pole of terrorist 
domination to the right pole of state influence on 
the trial. The vertical axis, starting in the zero 
middle point of not much politicisation from either 
the terrorists or the prosecution/authorities, depicts 
the level of media attention generated by the trial. 
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Based on a number of cases researched, this could 
produce the following typology: 
 
‐ A not-so-dramatic show where everyone 
complies with the existing rule of law, such as in the 
Dutch Piranha and Hofstad group cases. This trial 
would be positioned in the centre of the horizontal 
axis and low on the vertical axis. The actors refrain 
from adopting performative strategies. 
‐ A show, run by the terrorists and their 
lawyers, which generates a lot of media attention 
and inspires new rounds of violence by terrorist 
sympathisers. The Stammheim trial in the final 
stage would be an example of such a performative 
attempt by the defendants. 
‐ A show, run by the executive and the 
prosecution, on the extreme right pole exemplified 
by the classical Stalinist show trials. Here, the 
prosecution dominates the show, sometimes even 
hand-in-glove with the judge or jury. This show can 
also be a non-show like trial, closed from the public 
or the media, but organised by the state to serve 
security as a priority (but with a great performative 
power in a negative sense in the perception of the 
defendants and their sympathisers). The trial might 
however also be staged as a virtual show: the trial 
serves as a tool of risk justice, the crimes under 
consideration deal with conspiracies and 
preparations rather than constitute concrete 
attacks. 
‐ A trial may turn into a media show – not run 
so much by the terrorists or the prosecution, but 
dramatised in the media, often through resonance 
with public feelings of vengeance and outrage – 
often helped by side shows staged by audiences 
and groups outside the courtroom (victims, 
sympathisers, etc.). 
‐ A performance of justice: a show where the 
trial reveals injustice, where the verdict educates 
the public about the importance of the rule of law in 
a democratic society, creates a collective memory 
and sets standards for future conduct of states and 
people. This show is run by the judge/jury, but the 
performative strategy is based on a (perceived) 
neutral application of the law, not on partisan 
politicisation or risk justice. 
 
Before turning into a veritable media show, within 
all other types, variation is of course possible as to 
the level of politicisation, the level of media 
coverage, the level of public attention and the 
extent of side shows being organised during the 
trials.  
 
First Type: The Not-so-dramatic Show 
On The first type of trial is not that dramatic at all. A 
terrorist trial does not always have to be a social 
drama. It can be a show trial in the positive sense 
of the word: a quiet demonstration of justice, where 
law in action serves to communicate grievances 
and retribution and where a catharsis and mutual 
understanding is reached in the end. There are 
indeed instances when terrorism trials created only 
little spectacle. In the Netherlands, the trial against 
the Moluccan activists who raided and occupied the 
Indonesian Ambassador’s residence in 1970 in 
order to further their separatist cause, killing a 
police officer in this process, proceeded as 
smoothly as possible. The defendants pleaded 
guilty, complied with the court and raised only one 
moral question: they wanted their plight to be 
heard. They wanted to tell their story of expulsion 
from the Moluccan islands, the perceived promise 
made by the Dutch authorities to lobby for their 
independence from Indonesia and underline the 
discrimination they suffered in Dutch postcolonial 
society.43 In this instance, the terrorists did address 
a social grievance, but both the judge and the 
general audience were receptive to that narrative 
and acknowledged it in their reactions. The judge, a 
former colonial officer, paid homage to the fate of 
the Moluccans, their plight after 1950 and their 
loss of homeland. This in turn appeased the 
defendants and made them compliant with the 
Dutch rule of law. They accepted their sentence 
without protests – a sentence that was considered 
lenient.44 If there was a show at all, it demonstrated 
the Moluccans tragic faith and society’s feelings of 
guilt towards it. The law was violated, yes; a person 
was even killed. Nevertheless, there was no clash 
of moralities. On the contrary, the Moluccan 
activists appealed to the shared history with the 
Dutch population, invoked their parents’ loyal 
duties to the Queen and demanded the government 
to live up to its own standards and promises.45 
Another example of remarkable little theatre 
was offered by the latest hearings in the Hofstad 
group case, staged late 2010. When the trial 
started, following the murder of Theo van Gogh in 
                                                     
43 P. Bootsma, De Molukse acties. Treinkapingen en gijzelingen 1970-
1978 (Amsterdam: Boom, 2000). 
44 Interview with Henk Droessen, the lawyer of the South Moluccan 
youngsters who were tried for their actions in 1970 and 1975, 
Roermond, 14 March 2008; 11 May 2011, Utrecht; M. Rasser, ’The 
Dutch Response to Moluccan Terrorism, 1970-1978’, in: Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 28 (2005), No. 6, p. 481-492. 
45 A.P. Schmid, J.F.A. de Graaf, F. Bovenkerk, L.M. Bovenkerk-Teerink, 
L. Brunt: Zuidmoluks terrorisme, de media en de publieke opinie 
(Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Intermediair, 1982); See also Beatrice de Graaf 
and Froukje Demant, ‘How to Counter Radical Narratives: Dutch 
Deradicalization Policy in the Case of Moluccan and Islamic Radicals’, 
in: Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33 (2010), No. 5, p. 408-428.  
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November 2004, the defendants, who all belonged 
to a group around Van Gogh’s murderer 
Mohammed Bouyeri and who were charged with 
participation in a terrorist organisation and inciting 
hatred, refused every form of cooperation with the 
court. They argued that, first of all, the man-made 
Dutch judicial system was not in line with the divine 
rule of law and violated hakimiyyat Allah (the 
sovereignty of God). Secondly, they claimed that 
public and political pressure prevented them from 
getting a fair hearing in any case. In the heated and 
anxious climate of the months following November 
2004, this second complaint had some merit. 
Government officials proclaimed a ‘war’ against 
Dutch terrorists, public vigilance campaigns against 
terrorist attacks were launched, radicalised 
Muslims were spotted everywhere and revenge-
fuelled attacks were committed against mosques 
and other Muslim sites.46 The seven suspects were 
arrested and charged with being part of a terrorist 
and criminal organisation, engaging in inciting 
hatred and preparing for terrorist attacks. In 2006, 
they were convicted on the counts of attempting to 
murder police officers, on the possession of hand 
grenades and on membership of a terrorist 
organisation. One suspect, Jason W., who threw the 
hand grenade, was sentenced to 15 years in 
prison.47  
However, years passed without any jihadist 
attack, and the Dutch political and social climate 
changed. In 2008, the Court of Appeal in The 
Hague acquitted the Hofstad group members on 
the count of membership of a criminal terrorist 
organisation.48 The hearings in 2010 went ahead 
almost unnoticed, until Jason Walters stood up to 
announce his faith in the Dutch democratic system 
and the rule of law. He demonstrated his 
abandonment of extremist behaviour by conforming 
to the norms in court, wearing ordinary clothes and 
sporting a modern haircut. ‘I am certain that I will 
receive a fair trial’, he stated at the end of the pre-
trial hearing in the High-Security Court in 
Amsterdam on 16 July 2010.49 Although this story 
is only one instance of a terrorist’s public 
conversion, it provides a valuable insight: a change 
                                                     
46 ‘Zalm: we zijn in oorlog! Regering: terrorisme met wortel en tak 
uitroeien’, Algemeen Dagblad, 6 November 2004; ‘Terroristen met 
dubbele nationaliteit raken Nederlands paspoort kwijt. Kabinet 
verklaart de oorlog aan terreur’, Het Parool, 6 November 2004; 
‘Overheid wil meer armslag: anti-terreurmaatregelen’, Trouw, 6 
November 2004. 
47 The Hague Court, verdict, 10 March 2006. 
48 Court of Appeal in the Hague, verdict, 23 January 2008, 
LJN: BC2576, Gerechtshof 's-Gravenhage , 2200189706. 
http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/resultpage.aspx?snelzoeken=true&searc
htype=ljn&ljn=BC2576&u_ljn=BC2576 
49 The author was attended the hearing; cf. also ‘Jason werkt nu wel 
mee aan proces’, De Volkskrant, 17 July 2010. 
of times, demonstration of reflective justice and a 
terrorist conversion caused the trial to normalise. 
The charge of membership of a terrorist 
organisation was reconfirmed, but the trial hardly 
presented a show anymore: no party involved tried 
to turn it into a drama of conflicting moralities. 
Another example of a rather non-dramatic 
case is the trial against the first and only Dutch 
female terrorism suspect, Soumaya S. On 15 March 
2011, the Dutch Attorney-General submitted an 
advisory opinion to the Supreme Court that stated 
that the verdict against Soumaya S., who in 2005 
had been arrested and convicted for participating in 
a terrorist organisation, had to be annulled. 
Soumaya S. had already been sentenced for 
carrying an Agram 2000 machine gun, but had 
been put on trial a second time for being a member 
of a terrorist group. This last ruling is likely to be 
overturned – erasing the only convicted female 
terrorist from Dutch history.50 Strangely enough, 
almost no attention has been paid to all of this. No 
front page newspaper heading, interviews with 
disgruntled politicians or disappointed public 
prosecutor were seen nor heard in the national 
media. No audience outside or inside the 
courtroom applauded nor rallied against this 
verdict. No public outrage was discernable. This 
terrorism trial thus ended with a sizzle, rather than 
with a bang. 
 As has been stated above, the non-dramatic 
character of this trial can partly be explained by the 
brevity of the trial, the inquisitorial nature of the 
criminal law system, and the lack of historical 
examples. There is no repertoire of contentious 
terrorism trials in Dutch history. Nor were there 
enough sympathisers willing to stage side shows, 
probably due to the lack of organisation of and 
support for home grown jihadist terrorism in the 
years after 2004 within the Dutch Muslim 
community. 
 
Second Type: The Terrorists Are Running the 
Show 
Such instances like the Moluccan trials in the 
1970s, where terrorists remain within the 
boundaries set by the court proceedings and share 
society’s moral values and principles, where the 
magistrates and general public act subdued and 
are receptive to the terrorists’ story, are rare. They 
mostly depend on the lethality of the attacks, the 
duration of the terrorism campaign and on the 
historical context in which the terrorists operate. 
Irenic exchanges in court are an exception, rather 
                                                     
50Hoge Raad (High Council), ‘Conclusie advocaat-generaal in 
terrorismezaken’, The Hague, 15 March 2011. 
 
ICCT International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague 11 
than the rule. More often than not, terrorists 
challenge and contest society’s moral principles in 
court. This is the second type of terrorism trial: the 
show as staged by the terrorist suspects, where the 
suspects and their lawyers play their version of 
events. Of course, they already made the first hit. 
With the terrorist attack – given they are not 
arrested for preparatory actions post facto – they 
moved to centre stage and forced themselves in 
the limelight of public opinion already. With this 
attack, they conditioned the behaviour of states, 
tried to dictate terms to them and carried out their 
own primitive form of justice first. Now, they are 
confined to the narrow boundaries of the 
courtroom, but stand once more on the stage to be 
tried themselves. 
A major example of an intended show trial 
staged by terrorists can be found in the history of 
the Red Army Faction (RAF) in Germany. One of the 
largest successes of the founders of the RAF – 
Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Ulrike Meinhof 
and Jan-Carl Raspe – was that, together with their 
lawyers, they succeeded in presenting their trial, 
that lasted from May 1975 until April 1977, as a 
political one, conjuring up an image of political 
justice in Germany, portraying themselves as 
political warriors – and in the end – as the ultimate 
martyrs for the revolution’s cause. As such, a 
terrorist show trial departs from the classical 
Stalinist show trial: not the authorities, but the 
terrorists made a show out of it. As Jacco Pekelder 
and Klaus Weinhauer stipulated, lawyers sought 
the direct confrontation with the other parties 
involved in the justice system and carried out a 
‘political defence’: ‘More than attacking the actual 
accusations against their clients these 
Linksanwälte seemed to aim at undermining the 
legitimacy of the trial and the justice system that 
had produced it’.51 Although in a strict sense justice 
prevailed, the West-German judiciary damaged its 
own image of impartiality by reacting so nervously 
during the trial. The RAF-suspects used the court to 
stage their own play, which served their own 
(violent) political aims. They used the long drawn 
out period in which the Stammheim trial unravelled 
to mobilise a second and third tier of eager recruits, 
who initiated a second round of violence aimed at 
liberating their leaders from jail. When this 
backfired, climaxing in the raid on the Landshut 
airplane in Mogadishu in October 1977, the 
Stammheim prisoners opted for their final act: they 
committed suicide, but staged it as politicide by the 
                                                     
51 Jacco Pekelder and Klaus Weinhauer ‚Terrorists on Trial at 
Stammheim: the ‘Theatre of Political Justice’ in the working, draft 
paper on behalf of the NIAS Research Theme Group ‘Terrorists on 
Trial’, Wassenaar/The Netherlands, 2011. 
German authorities. With this final act of 
vengeance, they wrote their own ending to the 
state’s judicial script and turned it upside down. 
Subsequently, in the eye of (international) public 
opinion, not the terrorists, but the West-German 
authorities were put on trial. Hence, with the 
indispensable use of the media, they were able to 
fully appropriate the trial for their own ends and 
turn it into a veritable show – one with a presence 
that lasts until today.52  
 
Third Type: The State Is Running the Show 
Nevertheless, in a lot of other cases, terrorism trials 
are an instrument of the state’s performance, the 
third type of terrorist show trial. Authorities bring 
terrorists to justice in order to show that the threat 
is under control. Terrorism trials are a show in the 
sense that the executive strives to placate society 
that the perpetrators are caught, that law and order 
are secured and that there is no need for terror 
anymore. Sometimes, the substantive and 
procedural law is amended to suit security 
preferences. The executive selects a particular legal 
tool to ensure that the risk of acquittal is minimal. 
Hence, the authorities might resort to rewriting the 
script as well: they wait until the curtain of the 
criminal law trial falls and stage their final act 
behind the scenes. The acquitted suspect is either 
expelled from the country or made subject to 
permanent surveillance and control orders once he 
or she leaves the court building.53 One could argue 
that the Guantanamo tribunals were a type of trial 
where the government one-sidedly ran and ruled 
the show, without much media present. 
A variation within this type of state-
dominated performance is the virtual show, where 
the prosecution turns terrorism trials into a virtual 
trial because they more and more often take place 
before an alleged terrorist attack has been carried 
out. Contrary to what Foucault stated, it is not the 
case that ‘law recedes’.54 In fact, as Louise Amoore 
stipulates, ‘as risk advances [..] law itself authorizes 
a specific and particular mode of risk management’ 
which entails that ‘[e]vidence, the judgement of the 
expert witness, and the legal subject as bearer of 
                                                     
52 Cf. Ulf G. Stuberger, Die Tage von Stammheim. Als Augenzeuge beim 
RAF-Prozess (München: F.A. Herbig Verlagsbuchhandlung, 2007); 
Christopher R. Tenfelde, Die Rote Armee Fraktion und die Strafjustiz. 
Anti-Terror-Gesetze und ihre Umsetzung am Beispiel des Stammheim-
Prozesses (Osnabrück: Julius Jonscher Verlag, 2009); Pieter H. Bakker 
Schut, Stammheim. Der Prozeß gegen die Rote Armee Fraktion (Kiel: 
Neuer Malik Verlag, 1986). 
53 Cf. also Marieke De Goede, ‘The Politics of Preemption and the War 
on Terror in Europe’, in: European Journal of International Relations, 
Vol 14 (2008) No. 1, p. 161-185. 
54 M. Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College 
de France 1977-1978. Translated by G. Burchell (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007), p. 99. 
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rights are all reoriented in a risk regime that acts 
pre-emptively and authorizes with indefinite and 
indeterminate limits.’55 Competences, provisions 
and measures are adapted to make sure the judges 
(are likely to) render a conviction; either by using 
criminal law, or via administrative or immigration 
law (control orders, administrative rule or alien’s 
rights).  
Those trials that involve suspects arrested 
based on preparatory actions, on allegations, 
suspicions or intentions are virtual or ‘what if’ trials. 
An act is put under judicial scrutiny that may only 
exist in an imagined future – as (re-)constructed by 
the prosecuting authorities. Conspiracy trials, 
thought crime, inciting to hatred: such crimes divert 
from the habeas corpus principle and invoke 
possible deeds in the future, based on thoughts 
and/or allegations only. Depending on the 
assessment of preparatory evidence, the moment 
of culpability and the moment of the actual deed 
are severed. The relationship between offence and 
punishment becomes much more indirect. Pre-
emption and pre-mediation replace retribution and 
habeas corpus inquiries, thereby challenging basic 
human rights standards. Rather than assessing 
different versions of the ‘truth’ about an incident, 
judges have to deal with techniques of imagining a 
possible future. Premediation and security 
imagination replace responsibility for concrete 
actions. Terrorism trials serve to placate virtual 
threats; they have become instruments in risk 
management. The sword of justice has been 
‘securitised’. Deterrence, retribution for present 
dangers or restoration of social peace – the main 
functions of criminal law – give way to a secondary 
function: meting out sentences to pre-empt future 
risks. The trial becomes a theatre of imagined 
terrorist futures.56  
 
Fourth Type: The Media Is Running the Show 
Terrorism trials may turn into a show trial through 
the media and because the audience at large 
considers these trials a spectacle. Going back to 
the pre-modern age, trials always were very much 
theatre shows. The perpetrator was put on a 
scaffold, receiving bodily punished in full view of all 
the spectators. The aim of this performance was 
not carrying out worldly justice, but demonstrating 
the fate of sinners. A direct memento mori and a 
                                                     
55 Louise Amoore, ‘Risk before Justice: When the Law Contests Its Own 
Suspension’, in: Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 21 (2008), 
pp. 847-861, here: p. 850. 
56 For an analysis of premediation as a new security technique, cf: 
Marieke de Goede, ‘Beyond Risk: Premediation and the Post-9/11 
Security Imagination’, in: Security Dialogue, Vol. 39 (2008) No. 2-3, p. 
155-176. 
demonstration of how the gates of hell would open 
for anyone that trespassed against divine and 
human rule. Trials were a theatre of horror. Since 
those days, trials lost at least some if not most of 
their dramatic quality. They became a theatre of 
common sense and civility. Trials became a theatre 
of objectivity, prudence and standardised 
procedures. However, terrorism and war criminal 
trials have the tendency to slip back into pre-
modern theatres of terror. Hannah Arendt wrote 
about the trial of Eichmann and concluded that he 
was tried more for the suffering of the Jewish 
people than for his individual deeds.57 In the public 
opinion, as voiced by the media, terrorists should 
be punished for the fear and shock they inflicted 
upon society. In this way, adjudication based on 
concrete acts, individually attributed, disappears 
behind the horizon of public outrage. The trial 
becomes a show of public vengeance and outrage 
and terrorists are in most cases already sentenced 
by the media, leaving the judges hardly any room to 
manoeuvre, let alone to issue milder verdicts or 
even acquittals in danger of being (virtually) lynched 
themselves.58  
A media show can also be created through 
side shows, as staged by groups outside the 
courtroom. The audience – including the victims – 
has to make sense of the competing narratives as 
well. They sit and listen; or, as a Greek chorus, they 
comment. They sometimes have their own 
agendas. Sympathisers to the defendants might 
stage side shows, organise picket lines outside the 
court building, submit petitions and protest in the 
media against their treatment. Victims might 
organise themselves and protest against perceived 
lenience. Prisoners may initiate hunger strikes and 
defendants might raise an (international) lobby to 
support their cause, like the IRA did in the Bobby 
Sands case. The defendants may inspire or even 
appeal to their comrades and followers outside the 
courtroom to act on their behalf and initiate new 
rounds of violence, directed at putting pressure on 
the state, blackmailing the authorities to release 
the suspects or taking vengeance on the judges, as 
happened in Germany and Italy in the 1970s where 
second and third generations terrorists ‘punished’ 
judicial representatives for the verdict being issued 
against their leaders.  
 
                                                     
57 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of 
Evil (New York: Viking Press, 1963). 
58 Cf. for effects of media coverage about terrorism: Gabriel Weimann, 
‘The Theater of Terror: Effects of Press Coverage’, in: Journal of 
Communication Vol. 33 (Winter 1983), No. 1, p. 38-45; Brigitte L. 
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Fifth Type: A Performance of Justice 
The fifth type involves a show where the trial 
reveals injustice, where the verdict educates the 
public about the importance of the rule of law in a 
democratic society, creates a collective memory 
and sets standards for future conduct of authorities 
and people. This show is run by the judge/jury, 
whose performative strategy is based on a 
(perceived) neutral application of the law, in their 
refusal to accommodate to partisan politicisation or 
risk injustice. Amongst the competing narratives of 
(in)justice, the judges have to try to re-establish an 
accurate version of the facts and interpret and 
apply the law to it. They have to probe deep into 
different narratives, different testimonies and 
accounts to discover the various motives and 
intentions behind the terrorist actions. From this 
point of view, judges have first of all an obligation to 
establish a thorough, accurate and wide account of 
the facts pertaining to the incident before the court. 
Secondly, they have to reveal the underlying 
motives and strategies, and relate them to the 
context in which the incident happened. In carrying 
out such a penetrating inquiry, they can make a 
valuable contribution to the general understanding 
of the facts and the background. They more or less 
can write history. They may hear the victims, speak 
on behalf of a terrorised population and give them 
back their agency.  
Of course, re-establishing the truth is an 
especially troublesome endeavour when it concerns 
a preventive arrest, based on preparatory actions 
only. Judges are not there to make up for the 
authorities’ shortcoming or failures in gathering 
enough compelling evidence; they do not have to 
justify them. They have to settle the issue that falls 
under their jurisdiction, have to throw new light on 
the affair,59 which is difficult when an offence only 
exists as a possibility. Carrying out justice in a 
situation of security risks, of allegations, 
presumptions and crime-by-association runs the 
danger of turning the trial into a virtual show. The 
judges will be damned by an enraged public opinion 
and security officials if they acquit the suspects, 
and damned by equally outraged religious or ethnic 
minorities if they sentence the terrorists based on 
political or religious convictions alone.  
When the judges manage to keep the 
balance, a trial can become performative in itself. 
The verdict will not only be perceived as legally 
justified, the narrative of guilt and injustice writes 
history, changes existing norms and impacts values 
in society. As a nexus of terrorism violence, law 
                                                     
59 Cassese, Terrorism, p. 138. 
enforcement and public opinion, terrorism trials 
offer an ideal opportunity to showcase justice in 
progress and demonstrate how terrorist suspects 
are dealt with by the laws of the land.  
A performance of justice moreover could 
repair the information asymmetry that allowed 
terrorists to engage their terrorist constituencies 
and could undermine the narrative that armed 
groups utilise to attract support. Most importantly, 
terrorism trials are the platforms where victims may 
regain their voice and where their fate, as a 
consequence of the terrorist’s offence, is put centre 
stage. In the words of Tom Parker, policy director 
for Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Human Rights 
at Amnesty International USA, it is time to redress 
the balance and to use victim narratives to confront 
the violence of armed groups. Parker specifically 
addresses human rights defenders and NGOs, but 
the same contention could be made pertaining to 
terrorism trials: such trials offer a powerful platform 
for revealing and challenging the terrorists’ 
narratives by confronting them with the messages 
of horror, pain and destruction they inflicted upon 
their victims.60 
 
A Performance of Justice 
When does a terrorism trial become a show of 
justice? Performativity depends on the interplay 
between strategies of actors and audiences’ 
receptiveness, and is conditioned and facilitated by 
the proximate and distal context of the trial. When 
is an audience most receptive to these strategies, 
and whose idea of justice or whose injustice frames 
will prevail? We have demonstrated that terrorism 
trials in the majority of the types involve show 
elements. We would like to argue, however, that 
they have to be theatre as well – in the sense that 
they present a performance of justice. As stated 
above: ‘What counts is not that a trial is labelled a 
‘show trial’, it is, rather the end that the ‘show’ 
serves.61 The trial is the nexus where countervailing 
narratives meet, where moralities confront each 
other and where society addresses, confirms and 
possibly repairs a fundamental breach. A trial can 
demonstrate that trespassers will be convicted and 
that victims are heard. It may restore the balance of 
power and repairs the information asymmetry 
caused by the terrorist’s hold over their 
constituents. The trial and the verdict can 
undermine the terrorist’s claim to justice and reveal 
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the horror and destruction they inflicted upon their 
victims and upon society. In this sense, it is 
important that as many people as possible are able 
to watch the spectacle unfold.  
The question thus is: when will a terrorism 
trial be considered a performance of justice in the 
eyes of the public, and according to the law? First of 
all, the authorities should stick to the script. In a 
structural sense, the script does of course depend 
on the nature of the criminal law system; whether it 
is an inquisitorial or an adversarial system, whether 
evidence should be presented in the courtroom in 
full length, or can be dealt with on paper, before the 
trial starts. Nevertheless, in both the civil law and 
common law systems, performative strategies 
matter. Judges in particular have the responsibility 
to take care that a trial does not end up in a 
‘Pirandello play’, where each actor follows his own 
account of things, where the most powerful one 
decides upon the truth and where the spectator is 
left totally powerless to judge what the underlying 
narrative, let alone the truth about the plot is. 
Normality should be preserved as much as 
possible. The executive should refrain completely 
from tampering with legal rules during the trial; it 
should pay extraordinary heed not to be perceived 
as exerting political control over the proceedings.  
 Secondly, terrorism trials should not be 
based on premediation, virtualities, or seen as a 
tool of risk management. Magistrates and 
prosecutors have to make sure the trial does not 
develop into a show of security and risk 
management, like the trial at Stammheim did, or as 
the military tribunals in Guantanamo have done. 
The insatiable desire for security should not 
dominate justice; underlying political conflicts 
cannot be solved through security measures alone. 
Judicial catharsis should not be sacrificed to risk 
management.  
Thirdly, transparency counts. In the case of 
the Indonesian trial against Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, 
which is currently under way, the court decided to 
relocate the hearings from the South Jakarta 
district court to the larger Agriculture Ministry’s 
compound in Central Jakarta, to provide more room 
for the expected swell of people. Against critics who 
feared that this decision would turn the trial into a 
media circus, the court contended that an open 
prosecution, visible to as many spectators as 
possible, demonstrated justice in progress, 
underscored confidence in the state’s counter-
terrorism efforts and showed how new laws were 
put in practice. Thus, the trial would support 
Indonesia’s rule of law vis-à-vis extremist 
challenges.62  
Fourthly, a trial should leave room for 
countervailing narratives of truth and injustice. 
Judges should make sure that the transformation of 
a political conflict into a legal dispute takes into 
account all the narratives. Amongst all these 
competing narratives of justice/injustice, the judges 
have to try to re-establish an accurate version of 
the facts and interpret and apply the appropriate 
law to it. They have to probe deep into different 
narratives, different testimonies and accounts to 
discover the various motives and intentions behind 
the terrorist actions. From this point of view, judges 
have first of all an obligation to establish a 
thorough, accurate and wide account of the facts 
pertaining to the incident before the court. 
Secondly, they have to reveal the underlying 
motives and strategies, and relate them to the 
context in which the incident happened. In carrying 
out such a penetrating inquiry, they can make a 
valuable contribution to our understanding of the 
facts and the background. They more or less can 
write history. They may hear the victims, speak on 
behalf of terrorised population and give them back 
their agency. Responding to this with unemotional 
adjudication subsequently provides the best meta-
narrative of social and legal resilience thinkable. In 
this sense, the judges have to be aware of side 
shows too, were sympathisers, victims, other target 
audiences voice their version of justice. 
Judge Cassese’s reflections on the Achille 
Lauro Affair support this argument. In his seminal 
discussion of the lessons the international 
community of states could draw from this incident, 
Cassese points to the fact that there are long-term, 
mid-term and short-term policy objectives involved 
in dealing with terrorism. In the short run, 
governments might give preference to order and 
stability, viewing terrorism as an essential attack on 
that order and choosing to deal with this attack with 
repressive military or intelligence means only. 
However, he argues, terrorism might also reflect a 
‘desire for social change, innovation and the 
adaptation of international relations to changing 
needs, even when, alas, these are expressed in 
such perverted and destructive ways’. 63 In the mid-
term and long-term, intransigence to or even denial 
of this political narrative might alienate the 
terrorists’ broader constituencies from the political 
system they are operating in. This is not to say that 
the terrorists’ narrative should be accepted or even 
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agreed upon, but it should be countered and 
responded to rather than silenced by repressive 
means only. Judges or juries can have a role in 
unveiling these minority narratives by paying 
attention to the deeper motives or social 
grievances; not to view these as legitimate or 
rightful ‘root causes’ for terrorism. On the contrary, 
revealing these motives might even serve to mete 
out life long sentences for engaging in acts of 
terrorism. But revealing these narratives of social 
change does justice to the political conflict at hand. 
Denying or only criminalising these narratives and 
reducing the trial to a mere dichotomy of 
legal/illegal narrows reality and could in the end 
both backfire against the ‘order and stability’ 
paradigm of the executive and undermine criminal 
law’s legitimacy in the eyes of minorities.  
When these conditions are met, a trial will 
offer a platform on which narratives of injustice 
confront each other. A trial metes out justice not 
only to the acts of terrorism suspects, but also to 
their intentions, their motives and their 
legitimations. It reveals what ideas terrorists have 
to offer on questions of rights and righteousness. If 
an attack has taken place, or if suspects are 
arrested in a context of heavy political conflicts, law 
cannot fix this situation of political division. But 
glossing over the competing narratives, storing 
them away in indefinite detention does not serve to 
solve these conflicts either. Not bringing terrorists 
to justice out of short term security considerations 
might in fact further deepen the political 
antagonisms. If the terrorists only represent a tiny 
faction within a social movement, or even if they 
represent hardly anyone at all, letting them tell their 
story in court might just expose this narrative as the 
hysterical, nihilistic or illegitimate argument it is.  
After shocking incidents of terror and 
destruction, society needs to regain balance. 
Terrorism trials can help to repair the damage, to 
prevent a schism to unfold and to assist the 
immediate victims of terrorism attacks and society 
at large to come to terms with loss, grievances and 
grieve. An open and transparent trial is crucial for 
re-establishing what happened and why, and serve 
to institutionalise the need for vengeance and 
retribution. Inevitably, terrorism trials are show 
trials, staging a social drama, revealing narratives 
of injustice and grievances, but they have a judicial 
catharsis to offer – to all actors and audiences 
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